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ABSTRACT: This article examines Foucault’s interpretation of Machiavelli in his 1978 lec-
ture series, Sécurité, territoire, population. I argue that Foucault’s interpretation in these lec-
tures deliberately misrepresents Machiavelli. This misrepresentation allows him to develop 
later traditions in political thought in a way that precludes any importance Machiavelli 
might have had for the concerns of these later authors. Further, thorough analysis of Fou-
cault’s reading of Machiavelli uncovers a common thread between the two authors. For 
Machiavelli, the political is a space articulated by an immediacy of princes to peoples and 
generated from the fold formed by the difference between the qualities of the political hu-
mors. For Machiavelli, this difference of the humors—unstable and porous as it is—
between those who desire to dominate and those who desire not to be dominated is imma-
nent to the political. Read from this perspective Foucault’s critique of the tradition in anti-
Machiavellian literature develops a reading of Machiavelli that, even if it misrepresents him, 
breaks Machiavelli free from the place his thought generally occupies in the history of raison 
d’État. The paper then closes developing the notion that Foucault’s interpretation of Machi-
avelli points in the direction of a clear theme shared by the two — the theme of historically 
generated political technique(s). 
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Introduction 
For those familiar with Machiavelli’s texts, Foucault’s interpretation of Macchiavelli in his 
1978 lecture series Sécurité, Territoire, Population1 is surprising. Although Machiavelli figures 
prominently in five of the thirteen lectures,2 Foucault treats Machiavelli as if he were the 
author of only one book—The Prince—and his reading of this complex text treats it as if it 
                                                        
1  For instance, the theme of gouvernementalité emerges from his analysis of sixteenth-century anti-
Machiavellian literature in the February 1st lecture of Michel Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population (Par-
is: Seuil, 2004)/Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: 
Picador, 2007). (hereafter cited as STP). 
2 Namely, the lectures of January 18th and 25th, February 1st, and March 8th and 15th. 
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covered only one topic: how to guarantee the security of the Prince. Yet Foucault’s interpre-
tation of Machiavelli plays an important structural role in the development of many key 
themes that emerge from these lectures. Given the role Machiavelli and the traditions 
linked to him play, Foucault’s interpretation of this thinker calls for a more complete exam-
ination than has appeared to date.3 This article examines Foucault’s interpretation of Mach-
iavelli in these lectures, develops the understanding of territoriality at the center of this in-
terpretation, and then reveals inherent difficulties for Foucault’s reading of Machiavelli by 
carefully comparing that reading to passages from The Prince and the Discourses on Livy 
where the issue of territoriality figures prominently. Finally, textual strategies that may have 
motivated Foucault to present Machiavelli as he does are discussed.  
 
Foucault’s Reading of Machiavelli 
Foucault first introduces the figure of Machiavelli during this lecture cycle in connection 
with the theme of the town and the “problem of circulation” that it poses.4 For Foucault, the 
town is the site where the transition from systems of discipline with their processes of nor-
mation to apparatuses of security with their procedures of normalization occurred.5 As such, 
the town is at the center of the new mechanisms of security that began to emerge in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. To Foucault, the town marks an exception to the feudal-
ism of its milieu, and it is here that the theme of territoriality emerges, a theme Foucault will 
                                                        
3 A number of commentators acknowledge Machiavelli’s role and even question the adequacy of Fou-
cault’s interpretation of Machiavelli. However, to my knowledge, no reading yet has attempted a system-
atic textual analysis of Foucault’s claims in STP based on close readings of Machiavelli’s texts. For ex-
tended commentators’ discussions of the relationship between Foucault and Machiavelli, see Jérémie 
Barthas, “Machiavelli in Political Thought from the Age of Revolutions to the Present”, in John Najemy 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), esp. 261; 
Jérémie Barthas, L’argent n’est pas le nerf de la guerre: Essai sur une prétendue erreur de Machiavel (Rome: 
École Française de Rome, 2011), esp. 5-37; see also Mitchell Dean, Governmentaltity: Power and Rule in Mod-
ern Society (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2010, 2nd ed.), whose discussion of Foucault relative to 
Skinner is helpful (103–105, 116n3, and 123–24); Stuart Elden, “Rethinking gouvernementalité”, Political 
Geography, vol. 20 (2006), 1–5; Stuart Elden, “Governmentality, calculation, territory”, Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 25 (2007), 562–80; Adam Holden, and Stuart Elden, “‘It Cannot be a Real 
Person, a Concrete Individual’:Althusser and Foucault on Machiavelli’s Political Technique”, Borderlands, 
vol. 4, no. 2 (2005). Accessed April 10, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol4no2_2005/eldenhold_foucault.htm; Pasquale Pasquino, “Political 
Theory of War and Peace; Foucault and the History of Modern Political Theory”, Economy and Society, vol. 
22, no. 1 (1993), 77–88; and Michel Senellart, Les arts de gouverner: Du regimen médiéval au concept de gou-
vernement (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1995), 41–43; Michel Senellart, “Machiavel à l’épreuve de la gouvern-
mentalité”, in Gérald Sfez and Michel Senellart (eds.), L’enjeu Machiavel (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2001), 211–27.  
4 Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 66; Security, Territory, Population, 85. 
5 Foucault develops his analysis of the town while considering the related themes of grain, street, and 
contagion. On this, see Alderson and his analysis of the US-Canadian border (Christopher Alderson, 
“Border Security/Border Sécurité”, in Sam Binkey and Jorge Capetillo-Ponce (eds.), A Foucault for the 21st 
Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 203–20).  
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use to contextualize the agenda motivating Machiavelli’s thought. According to Foucault, 
the question of the free town, with the problems it poses for territorial sovereignty, engen-
ders the development of mechanisms for security.6 The town exceeds the sovereign–territory 
relation, and in this excess it displaces the territoriality element key to the sovereign exer-
cise of power, putting its role into play.7 
 The issue of the sovereign, for Foucault, is that of the “safety of the territory, or the 
safety of the sovereign who rules over the territory.”8 Foucault introduces Machiavelli in his 
lectures to identify this problem as Machiavelli’s own: 
 
The problem posed by Machiavelli was precisely to know how in a given territory—whether 
it had been conquered or had been inherited—whether the power was legitimate or illegiti-
mate—how to make it happen that the power of the sovereign is not threatened, or at any 
rate, how it can remove, with full certainty, the threats weighing on it. The security of the 
Prince [sûreté du Prince]—this was the problem of the Prince in the reality of his territorial 
power. This was the political problem of sovereignty.9 
                                                        
6 As Foucault states: “This was the town that had the possibility and to which one had recognized the 
right to govern itself up to a certain point and within certain well-marked limits. But the town represent-
ed always a sort of zone [plage] of autonomy in relation to the great organizations and mechanisms of 
territorial power characteristic of a power developed through feudalism […] Fundamentally it was neces-
sary to reconcile the fact of the town and the legitimacy of sovereignty” (Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Pop-
ulation, 66; Security, Territory, Population, 64). 
7 Commenting on this transition in Foucault, Giogio Agamben suggests another way to read the shift. 
Where Foucault would seem to distinguish strongly between the juridico–institutional and biopolitical 
models of power, Agamben wants to read these trajectories in his thought for their “hidden point of in-
tersection”: “the two analyses [juridico–institutional and biopolitical] cannot be separated and […] the 
inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign 
power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In 
this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. Placing biological life at the center of its 
calculations, the modern State therefore does nothing other than bring to life the secret tie uniting power 
and bare life” (Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 6).  
8 Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 67; Security, Territory, Population, 65. As Foucault describes the 
issue, “In The Prince, Machiavelli’s problem is to decide how a province or a territory, acquired through 
inheritance or by conquest, can be held against its internal and its external rivals. Machiavelli’s entire 
analysis is aimed at defining what reinforces the link between prince and state […] The theoreticians of 
state tried to keep aloof from Machiavelli both because he had at this moment a very bad reputation and 
because they couldn’t recognize their own problem in his problem, which was not the problem of the 
state but the problem of the relationships between the prince—the king—and his territory and his people” 
(Michel Foucault, “The Political Technology of Individuals”, in Luther Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick 
Hutton (eds.), Technologies of the Self (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 150).  
9 Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 67; Security, Territory, Population, 65. As Holden and Elden de-
scribe this shift: “What we find here is a shift then, both in the subject and object of political rule (in part 
because the target becomes the object) but also, crucially in their order. In the first it is the Prince and the 
territory he rules; in the second the population and then, only as a consequence, those that govern. In 
addition the archaic concept of ‘surety’ [sûreté] is replaced with the modern problem of security” (Holden, 
and Stuart Elden, “‘It Cannot be a Real Person’”, 15). 
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In the problem of circulation that emerges with the issues of the street, grain, and contagion, 
a shift has taken place, and Foucault clearly places Machiavelli on the side of that historical 
divide superceded by newly emerging strategies for posing and resolving problems of gov-
ernance.10 By virtue of the importance accorded to them, issues of circulation increasingly 
displace an understanding of territory as extended space. As Foucault reads Machiavelli, 
the chief occupation of the Prince is to fix and demarcate an extended territory for the sake 
of guaranteeing his safety. In contrast with the forms of governance that will emerge later, 
the sovereign state is not concerned with the people in a direct way;11 rather, the people are 
affected through the relationship of the sovereign to their territory.12  
 However, immediately following Machiavelli and partially in reaction to him, Fou-
cault continues by saying that as a new series of governance techniques and strategies 
emerge and solidify over the next two centuries, the notion of “population” displaces terri-
                                                        
10 There is a strong similarity between Foucault’s description of Machiavelli here—as responsible for the 
ultimate expression of a discourse around juridical sovereignty—and the way Foucault situates Machia-
velli at the threshold of the formulation of history as a historico-political continuum in Il faut defendre la 
Société (Michel Foucault, Il faut defendre la Société (Paris: Seuil, 1976)/Michel Foucault, Society Must Be De-
fended, translated by David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), hereafter cited as DS). In these lectures, 
particularly in the lecture of February 25th, Foucault identifies Machiavelli (choosing him over Hobbes) as 
someone whose thought (and its relation to history) was a clear precursor to the history of the Franks as 
told by Boulainviller—who was the first to conceive a continuum between history and politics. See DS, 
the February 25th and March 3rd lectures.  
11 For Foucault, the specific feature that separates Machiavelli’s historicizing from Boulainvillier’s is the 
way that each relates, or fails to relate, historical discourse to the groups whose relations of force and 
power are society’s “grid of intelligibility”. On Foucault’s reading of Machiavelli, “History is not the do-
main where he analyzes power relations. For Machiavelli history is simply a source of examples, a sort of 
collection of jurisprudence or of tactical models for the exercise of power. For Machiavelli, history simply 
records relations of force and the calculations to which they gave rise” (Foucault, Il faut defendre la Société, 
150-1; Society Must Be Defended, 169). In contrast, Boulainvillier intends his discourse describing the as-
cendancy and decline of the Frankish aristocracy to propagate a series of effects within the political do-
main by awakening the French aristocracy to the elements necessary for their revival. Boulainvillier ap-
parently exceeds Machiavelli’s historicizing by energetically relating his history of the groups that form 
the subject term of the power relation with the aim of altering that series of relations. See also Michel 
Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité I (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 128/Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 
1, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 97). 
12 As Elden explains, the category of territoriality is at play in both the juridical state and the disciplinary 
state (Elden, “Governmentality, calculation, territory”, 562-80). However, given Foucault’s logic through-
out the lecture, the notion of territoriality in play could not be the same. For Foucault, there is certainly a 
shift from the disciplinary territory to the state of security. But for Elden, this would actually be the second 
shift that involved territoriality. The first would have been the shift from the juridical state to the discipli-
nary state, which also corresponds to two different types of territoriality: the feudal and the frontier (see 
Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 111; Security, Territory, Population, 108). Here it is also important to 
note, as Elden does, that for Foucault it is not the case that the second shift—the one from the disciplinary 
state to that of security—would involve something aspatial (Elden, “Governmentality, calculation, terri-
tory”, 567).  
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toriality as the principal focus of authors reasoning on governance.13 Thus, there is a shift 
from the concern with territoriality to a concern with population that occurs in parallel with 
a shift in concern from the surface occupied by a state to the mass of its population.14 In this 
shift, the notion of territoriality is demoted to become one element among several for re-
flecting on and affecting the population.15 Thus, in the midst of his reflections on one of 
these later texts,16 Foucault specifies that in considering territory, one considers a variety of 
features such as its barrenness or fertility, the density or sparseness of its population, and 
the activity or idleness of its inhabitants, but these features are no longer mere attributes of 
land and have come to operate instead as variables in emerging strategies and techniques 
for affecting a population.17  
                                                        
13 In the final lecture of DS (March 17, 1976), Foucault describes the penetration of disciplinary techniques 
in the second half of the eighteenth century as “addressed to a multiplicity of men, not to the extent that 
they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a 
global mass that is affected by overall processes of birth, death, illness, production and so on. So after a 
first seizure of power over the body in an individualizing mode, we have a second seizure of power that 
is not individualizing, but, if you like, massifying, that is directed not to man-as-body but at man-as-
species” (Foucault, Il faut defendre la Société, 216; Society Must Be Defended, 243). This new set of techniques 
for the application of power—which Foucault names biopolitics—does not replace the previous practices, 
but rather complements and infiltrates them as a supplement to the regimes of disciplinary techniques 
already at work.  
14 “And perhaps in a completely global, coarse, and therefore inexact way, we could reconstruct the great 
forms, the great economies of power in the West in the following manner: first, the state of justice, born in 
a feudal type of territoriality and which corresponded substantially to a society of customary law and 
written law, with a whole interplay of commitments and litigations; secondly, the administrative state 
that corresponds to a society of regulations and disciplines; and, lastly, a state of government that is no 
longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the popula-
tion, with its volume, its density, and, for sure, the territory it covers, but which is, in a way, only one of 
its components” (Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 113; Security, Territory, Population, 109–110; my 
emphasis). 
15 For Foucault, this shift did not occur only with respect to the notion of territory. A similar shift occurred 
in the notion of family. With the emergence of the problematic of population, the notion of family comes 
into play and shifts from serving as the model of governance to being an instrument of intervention, a 
variable for influencing dynamics within the population. Thus, with the formulation of the problematic of 
population, both family and territory begin to operate as variables.  
16 Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 99; Security, Territory, Population, 96. The text under discussion is 
Guillame de la Perriere’s Le miroir politique.  
17 I agree with Elden,who reads this shift in Foucault as more of a transformation of both territory and 
population than a shift from territory to population: “In the era of security both territory and population 
are understood in a transformed sense. Indeed we could make the claim that the categories of ‘population’ 
and ‘territory’ themselves only really emerge at this political juncture. Just as the people become under-
stood as both discrete individuals and their aggregated whole, the land they inhabit is also something 
that is understood in terms of its geometric, rational properties, or ‘qualities.’ Territory is more than 
merely land, but a rendering of the emergent concept of ‘space’ as a political category: owned, distributed, 
mapped, calculated, bordered, and controlled. Foucault’s notion of the politics of calculation is therefore 
crucial but not as something which only manifests itself in population, but, rather, in territory, too. The 
Foucault Studies, No. 19, pp. 172-190. 
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 In his lectures of January 25th and February 1st, Foucault extends and develops this 
interpretation as he describes a series of writers who attempted to formulate an art of gov-
ernment making use of Machiavelli as a point of repulsion (point de la repulsion)18 in the de-
velopment of their theories. These lectures are significant because they act as the backdrop 
for the techniques, practices, and strategies of governance that Foucault will identify with 
his notion of gouvernementalité. However, these lectures also describe a history of reasoning 
about the political in which Machiavelli figures prominently but from which, at the same 
time, he is interestingly excluded. Thus, Machiavelli is at the center of a debate on the na-
ture and character of the arts of governance (les arts de gouverner) that stretches from 1580 to 
1660,19 but although this debate is conducted through Machiavelli, making use of his texts, it 
develops in a way that has no genuine connection to the program that Foucault identifies as 
Machiavelli’s.20 Despite the fact that the discussions invoke Machiavelli, Foucault will not 
trace a direct line of transmission from the concerns that motivated Machiavelli to the con-
cerns of these later authors.  
 While Foucault does not locate an “art of government” in Machiavelli, neither does 
he identify Machiavelli with the emergence of the doctrine of raison d’État.21 During a sec-
ond series of debates that occur through reference to Machiavelli at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, the opponents of raison d’État22 identify this kind of reasoning with 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
same kinds of mechanisms can be found in both, at root grounded in the relation between governmentali-
ty and calculation” (Elden, “Governmentality, calculation, territory”, 578).  
18 Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 93; Security, Territory, Population, 89). 
19 For another reading of this period, see the extensive study by Senelart (Senellart, Les arts de gouverner).  
20 As similarly happens, on Foucault’s account, in the case of Marx (Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Popula-
tion, 249; Security, Territory, Population, 243).  
21 See March 8th lecture in STP. There is a strong similarity between Foucault’s insistence in STP that 
Machiavelli is not a proponent of raison d’état and his insistence during the 1975–1976 lectures that in the 
final analysis, Machiavelli fails to render the principles of managing the State as principles of historical 
intelligibility. Rather, he attributes this accomplishment to Boulainvillier, who bases his work on estab-
lishing a historico-political continuum between the conquering Franks, the administrative nobility of the 
Roman Gauls, and the Gaulish people. As Foucault states, “Boulainvillier makes what had until then 
been no more than State management’s principle of rationality function as a principle for understanding 
history” (Foucault, Il faut defendre la Société, 152; Society Must Be Defended, 170), and “it is the use of the 
State’s model of managerial rationality as a grid for the speculative understanding of history that estab-
lishes the historico-political continuum” (Ibid., 152; 171). Boulainvillier goes further than Machiavelli 
because his history aims to modify the relations of force, not just analyze or interpret them, and to make 
historical knowledge an element of the struggle it recounts and a weapon in the war it relates. In thus 
describing Boulainvillier’s history, Foucault distinguishes it from what Machiavelli does with history, 
reminding us that in Machiavelli, “History simply records relations of force and the calculations to which 
they give rise” (Ibid., 150–51; 169). 
22 Foucault defines raison d’État as a new form of governmental rationality that attempted to conceptualize 
the salvation of the state on its own, without reference to any outside or external principles of intelligibility 
(Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 257–58; Security, Territory, Population, 265–66). Given the very 
specific way Foucault describes the techniques of raison d’État in the similar and parallel analysis of these 
issues in the lecture “Omnes et singulatim” it is not surprising that he does not figure Machiavelli as an 
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Machiavelli himself, who here serves as a symbol for “the Prince’s whims or laws.”23 On the 
other side of this polemic, most of the proponents of raison d’État disavow Machiavelli be-
cause they view his problem as solely the calculation of the prince’s interests.24 Thus, both 
the proponents and opponents of raison d’État reject Machiavelli, while at the same time 
using terms and relations that originate in and through him to conduct their arguments in 
this debate.  
 
Bacon and Machiavelli 
Foucault’s final reference to Machiavelli occurs in the March 15, 1978 lecture.25 As Foucault 
develops his line of argument here, it is clear that due to the force of the debates that shape 
the reception of Machiavelli’s works, even a sympathetic reader like Francis Bacon (1561–
1626) will read him through a problematic of population. In this lecture, Foucault describes 
how three features of pastoral government—salvation, obedience, and truth—relate to the 
newly emerging practices associated with raison d’État in the seventeenth century.26 Fou-
cault links Bacon and Machiavelli by way of Bacon’s reasoning on the phenomena of sedi-
tion and revolt in his essay, “Of Seditions and Troubles.”27 Here again, Foucault portrays 
Machiavelli’s concern as the problem of the Prince’s relationship to the principality and the 
perpetual threat faced by the Prince of having that connection to the territory broken. Bacon 
similarly describes the possibility of sedition and riot as something that “belongs to the dai-
ly life of states, or at any rate belongs to the intrinsic virtualities of the state.”28 However, 
Foucault shows that the focus has undergone a shift in Bacon and is no longer the fortunes 
of the sovereign, as it was for Machiavelli. For Bacon, the problem of sedition and unrest is 
intrinsic to the state itself, and its threat is an ever-present possibility even (and perhaps 
especially) in the midst of those periods of the greatest calm.29 In contrast, for Machiavelli, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
advocate, apologist, or practitioner of raison d’État. Concerning the techniques associated with raison 
d’État, Foucault emphasizes their specificity: “After all, in this regard at least, political practices resemble 
scientific ones. It’s not ‘reason in general’ that is applied, but always a very specific type of rationality. 
What is striking here is that the rationality of state power was reflective and perfectly aware of its speci-
ficity. It was not tucked away in spontaneous, blind practices. And it was not some retrospective analysis 
that brought it to light. It was formulated especially in two sets of doctrine: raison d’État and theory of 
police” (Foucault, “’Omnes et singulatim’ vers une critique de la raison politique” in Dits et écrits, II, 1976-
1988 (Paris: Gallimard, 2000) 968-969; Foucault, “’Omnes et singuatim’: Toward a Critique of Political Rea-
son in Essential Works of Foucault, v. 3, Power (New York: New Press, 2000), 313–14. 
23 Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 249; Security, Territory, Population, 244. 
24 Ibid., 250; 245. 
25 This lecture is the second in a series of three lectures that address the problems associated with the 
emergence of raison d’État. 
26 Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 261; Security, Territory, Population, 267. 
27 Ibid., 
28 Ibid., 277; 271. 
29 May describes this same notion as the resistance pole of the power/resistance relationship that emerges 
in Foucault. As May describes it, resistance for Foucault is a historical phenomenon—one that is not es-
sentially linked to the notion of a permanent subject—and in a particular sense: “What Foucault wants to 
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“the people were essentially passive and naïve and had to be the instrument of the Prince or 
else they would be the instrument of the nobles.”30 The real threat, according to Machiavelli, 
is posed by the nobles, due to their tendencies to scheme amongst themselves or form hos-
tile military alliances with external powers. However, for Bacon, the threat to the stability of 
the state stems from the people and not from the nobles, since, on Bacon’s account, it is rela-
tively easy to secure oneself against the nobles: “The problem for government is not the 
Prince’s rivals but the people, for, once again, the nobles are either bought or beheaded. 
They are close to the government whereas the people are both close and distant.”31 Because 
the people are the primary source of an ever-present and ever-hidden possibility for sedi-
tion, knowing their belly and their mind is the principal responsibility of those who govern. 
While the prince in Machiavelli should take pains to appear just to the people and yet not 
strive to be just, for Bacon, those who govern need to be concerned with “what is really go-
ing on in the minds of the governed.”32 Thus, even as Bacon acknowledges Machiavelli as 
his authority, the target of governance has shifted for him. Bacon is less concerned with 
forming means for securing the integrity of the territory than he is with articulating a strat-
egy of intervention dependent on his conception of the people as a mass phenomenon. Alt-
hough Bacon situates himself as following in Machiavelli’s footsteps, his interpretation of 
Machiavelli has already moved beyond Machiavelli’s concerns, which focused on securing 
the prince’s relationship to the territory. 
 In distinguishing the issues that motivated Machiavelli from the issues motivating 
the sixteenth- and eighteenth-century movements and from later interpreters like Bacon, 
Foucault reaffirms his contention that the core issue for Machiavelli is that of preserving the 
Prince’s relationship to his territory, where territory is defined as the sheer mass of surface 
occupied. In each case, Foucault contends that later interpreters of Machiavelli ultimately fail 
to engage the problem motivating the author of The Prince, which, according to Foucault, 
was the issue of territoriality.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
acknowledge with the concept of essential resistance is the permanent possibility of revolt. He wants to 
elicit the recognition that the contingencies of history by which we have achieved our present are precise-
ly that— contingencies—which can be, and often are, struggled against and altered. Thus he finds re-
sistance to be immanent to the power relationship, which makes every application of power a historical 
event and every constraining–constrained relationship a fragile balance” (Todd May, The Philosophy of 
Foucault (Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 2006), 115). This understanding of history in Fou-
cault bears an important resemblance to the event described in Machiavelli’s Discorsi III.1 as the “return 
to beginnings” (riducere inverso principii loro), in which the apparent necessity of structures of governance 
is disclosed as contingent by an event in which the people’s desire not to be dominated expresses itself as 
historical action. See Miguel Vatter, Between Form and Event: Machiavelli’s Theory of Political Freedom (Dor-
drecht: Kluwer, 2000), esp. Part I, Chs. 4–6, and Part III, Chs. 3–4.  
30 Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 272; Security, Territory, Population, 351-352. 
31 Ibid., 272, and 351-352. 
32 Ibid. 
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Machiavelli and Territoriality 
The question then arises: Is the issue of territoriality as central to Machiavelli’s analyses of 
princes’ relationship to their principalities as Foucault claims? Does an examination of even 
his two most frequently cited texts, De Principatibus and the Discorsi sopra la prima deca di 
Tito Livio,33 support Foucault’s line of interpretation? A careful examination of the issues in 
which the notion of territory figures prominently seems to uncover a version of Machiavelli 
that is at odds with the version articulated by Foucault in these lectures.  
 For instance, the issue of territory figures prominently in Machiavelli’s lengthy dis-
cussions of certain themes concerning the practical conduct of warfare. A good example is 
his discussion of the efficacy of fortresses.34 As fortresses provide a method for handling 
internal and external threats, one would expect Machiavelli’s reasoning about them to indi-
cate clearly whether or not they aid in securing the prince’s territory. Machiavelli concludes 
that for the most part, fortresses are at best useless to the prince who employs them35 and at 
worst the principal cause of the reason behind the prince’s loss of his state.36 Thus, when he 
describes the career of the Genoese fortress—the Codefà—built by Louis XII to hold Genoa 
securely, Machiavelli clearly states that it was indeed impregnable “by its site and by every 
other circumstance.”37 Still, it was lost relatively quickly in 1512 when Ottaviano Fregoso 
                                                        
33 Niccolò Machiavelli, De Principatibus, in Niccolò Machiavelli (auth) and Mario Puppo (ed.), Opere 
politiche (Florence: Le Monnier, 1969), 43-181/Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, translated by Harvey Mans-
field (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 2nd ed.); Niccolò Machiavelli, Discoursi, in Opere politiche 
(Florence: Le Monnier, 1969), 184-662/Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, translated by Harvey Mans-
field and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Hereafter cited as Principe and 
Discorsi respectively. 
34 Principe XX and Discorsi II.24, II.25, III.27, and III.37. None of these passages affirm the effectiveness of 
fortresses for either princes or republics. Rather, fortresses are either unnecessary or harmful. As Machia-
velli states at the close of the discussion of fortresses in Principe XX: “Therefore the best fortress there is, is 
not to be hated by the people, because although you may have fortresses, if the people hold you in hatred 
fortresses do not save you; for to people who have taken up arms foreigners will never be lacking to come 
to their aid” (Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 157–58; Machiavelli, The Prince, 87). See also Discorsi II.21 for a 
relevant discussion on the greater effectiveness of unseen rule for administering a conquered people.  
35 Or of very limited and dubious utility: “If you make fortresses, they are useful in times of peace because 
they give you more spirit to do evil to them [the people], but they are very useless in times of war be-
cause they are assaulted by the enemy and by subjects; nor is it possible for them to put up resistance to 
both the one and the other” (Discorsi II.24: Machiavelli, Discoursi, 461; Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 185). 
Fortresses would seem to offer genuine, though still limited, utility in one case: “Thus if a prince who has 
good armies has some fortress upon the seacoast at the frontier of his state that can stand up against the 
enemy for several days until he is in order, it would sometimes be a useful thing but is not necessary” 
(Discorsi II.24: ibid., 467; 189).  
36 For Machiavelli, one of the causes that makes a prince believe he can be hated by his subjects is the pos-
session of fortresses, since these “make you more audacious and more violent toward your subjects” (le ti 
fanno essere piú audace e piú violento ne’ sudditi; Discorsi II.24: ibid, 461; 195). 
37 Discorsi II.24: ibid, 464; 187. 
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laid siege to the fortress38 and then, having taken the fortress, promptly destroyed it. Mach-
iavelli describes Fregoso's reasoning: 
 
Everyone believed and many people counseled that he should have preserved it as his ref-
uge for any accident, but being very prudent he knew that not fortresses but the will of men 
[ma la volontà degli uomini] maintains princes in their states, and he ruined it. Thus founding 
his state not upon the fortress but upon his virtue and prudence, he has held and holds it [lo 
ha tenuto e tiene].39 
 
Thus, Fregoso’s policy accords with Machiavelli's evaluation of fortresses in general. At best 
they are of no value in securing and maintaining the integrity of the prince’s territory. This 
quotation in fact suggests that there is another relationship at play, one more essential to 
princes than their relationship to the territory: the relationship of princes to the “will of 
men”.  
 
Armi Proprie, Arms of One’s Own 
This second theme—the relationship between princes and the “will of men”—is in fact one 
that Machiavelli emphasizes frequently throughout the Principe and the Discorsi when he 
reasons about whether it is better for princes to make use of the arms of others or arms of 
one’s own. This theme even emerges as a frame for his discussion of the efficacy of fortress-
es. Thus, whether or not the prince continues to hold his territory despite having made use 
of fortresses depends on whether the prince has armed or disarmed his people. As Machia-
velli states in Principe XX: 
 
There has never been, then, a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; on the contrary, 
whenever he has found them unarmed he has always armed them because, in arming them, 
those arms become yours [armandosi, quelle armi diventono tuo]; those become faithful whom 
you had under suspicion, and those who were faithful remain so; and from your subjects 
they are made your partisans.40  
  
At least where the efficacy of fortresses is concerned, the relationship between the prince 
and his territory is dependent on whether or not the prince arms his subjects. Arming one’s 
own subjects and having arms of one’s own41 is a persistent theme of reflection in Machia-
                                                        
38 Machiavelli describes Fregoso taking the fortress from the French by essentially starving them out over 
the course of 16 months (Discorsi II.24: ibid, 464; 187). 
39 Discorsi II.24: ibid, 464; 187. 
40 Principe XX: Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 153; Machiavelli, The Prince, 83; also Discorsi II.24: Machiavelli, 
Discoursi, 466-67; Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 189.  
41 To see that these two need not be the same, it is important to carefully follow Machiavelli’s reasoning 
concerning the use of the “arms of others” (armi d’altri). For instance, on the effective management of the 
defects of mercenary forces, see Erwin, “A War of One’s Own”, British Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
Vol. 18, no. 4 (2010), 558–70; also Christopher Lynch “War and Foreign Affairs in Machiavelli’s Florentine 
Histories”, The Review of Politics, vol. 74 (2012), esp. 15n32). 
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velli’s writings.42 Many discussions of armed force in Machiavelli describe arms of one’s own 
as the only genuine foundation for the prince’s security.43 Fortresses undermine this project 
since they neither provide protection against the threat posed by one’s own subjects nor are 
particularly useful against external threats. An organized invading army with effective cap-
tains will simply bypass fortresses in pursuit of strategic objectives.44  
 For Machiavelli, the most effective way of holding one’s territory is to both arm 
one’s own subjects and not be hated by them.45 The fundamental issue for Machiavelli sur-
rounding the construction and employment of fortresses seems to lead us far away from 
Foucault's characterization of the relationship between the prince and his territory in Mach-
iavelli. Concerning the efficacy of fortresses, the fundamental issue for Machiavelli is not 
how best to design or defend them, but rather the character of the relationship that holds 
                                                        
42 See, for instance, Principe, particularly Chs. VI, VIII, and X, but also XII, XIII, XIX, XX, and XXVI; Discor-
si I.21, I.43, II.10, II.12, II.20; and Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe seguito da Dell’arte della guerra (Rome: 
Newton & Compton, 1998), Book I. 
43 One could easily infer that having arms of one’s own implies having men who are willing to lay down 
their lives for their country. But as Lynch states: “From this it might be inferred that the object of a prince 
is to get his soldiers to ‘want to die for’ him, and that the object for a republican captain is to get the sol-
diers under his command to want to die for the city or for the sake of the common good. […] But to state 
an obvious point, it is killing, being able to kill, and seeming to be able to kill rather than dying that 
brings victory to the army and glory to the captain. The question […] is not how to get men to want to die 
for their prince, city or country but how to ‘keep them in the field’ so that they can and will ‘fight well’ 
for their captain” (Christopher Lynch, “Interpretive Essay” in Christopher Lynch (ed. and trans.) and 
Niccolò Machiavelli (auth.), Art of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 201). 
44 Discorsi II.24: Machiavelli, Discoursi, 467-68; Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 204. 
45 However, it is not the case that both of these conditions must be met for a prince to be successful in this 
regard. For Machiavelli, it is entirely thinkable that a prince is free to disregard the people should he have 
the support of the soldiers, especially when the army constitutes a separate factor as an independent in-
stitution, dependent on neither the nobles nor the people. Thus, during his discussion of the challenges 
faced by the Roman emperors in Principe XIX (De contemptu et odio fugiendo), Machiavelli makes this point 
about the relationship that existed between the emperors and the soldiers: “For the people loved quiet, 
and therefore loved modest princes, and the soldiers loved princes with a military spirit who were inso-
lent, cruel and rapacious. […] And most of them [the emperors], especially those who came to the princi-
pate as new men, once they recognized the difficulty of these two diverse humors turned to satisfying the 
soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. This course was necessary; for since princes cannot fail to 
be hated by someone, they are at first forced not to be hated by the people generally; and when they can-
not continue this, they have to contrive with all industry to avoid the hatred of those communities which 
are most powerful. And so those emperors who because they were new had need of extraordinary sup-
port stuck to the soldiers rather than the people” (Principe XIX: Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 144–45; 
Machiavelli, The Prince, 76). Machiavelli stipulates in the same chapter that both the sultan of the Otto-
mans, Selim I, and the sultan of the Mamelukes in Egypt made it their aim to satisfy their soldiers. In fact, 
the suggestion of this chapter is that any prince who “has armies joined together which are entrenched in 
the government and administration of provinces” (Principe XIX: Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 151; Machi-
avelli, The Prince, 81) might find himself similarly disposed to favor the soldiers at the people’s cost. See 
also Discorsi III.24: Machiavelli, Discoursi, 583; Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy 270.  
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between the prince and his people and whether and how the prince has already gone about 
composing forces of his own. 
 
Founding Cities 
This last line of argument is repeated and further developed with respect to another theme 
that is closely connected to issues of territory. In both the Principe and the Discorsi, Machia-
velli directly reasons about territory and its qualities when he discusses the choice of a site 
in the founding of a city.46 Thus, in Discorsi I.1, Machiavelli clearly reasons that in the choice 
of the site and the ordering of the laws one can recognize the virtú of the founder. When 
selecting the territory for the future city, the founder is confronted with the dilemma of 
whether it is better to found the city on fertile or on sterile land. A sterile site would seem to 
be preferable because it forces men to be industrious. However, Machiavelli immediately 
counters that a sterile site is not the correct choice because men desire to command others and 
to expand their dominium. As he then concludes: 
 
Since men cannot secure themselves except with power [non potendo gli uomini assicurarsi se 
non con la potenzia], it is necessary to flee this sterility in a country and to settle in the most 
fertile places, where, since [the city] can expand because of the abundance of the site, it can 
both defend itself from whomever might assault it and crush anyone who might oppose its 
greatness.47  
 
Machiavelli then retracts the apparent choice here by affirming that there really are no alter-
natives, since the virtuous founder would only select a fertile site for founding a city.48  
 However, choice of a fertile site would seem to destine the population to laziness, 
corruption, and discord.49 Therefore, the necessity of selecting a fertile site imposes yet an-
other necessity on those who found and maintain cities. The remedy for problems caused 
by founding the city in a fertile location lies in the second feature that reveals the virtù of 
the founder: the ordering of the laws.50 As Machiavelli states, “As to the idleness that the 
                                                        
46 See, for instance, Principe XIV, Discorsi I.1, and Machiavelli, Il Principe seguito da Dell’arte della Guerra, VI). 
I am fundamentally in agreement with both Foucault and many commentators that for Machiavelli, the 
state is never the impersonal state but is always the state of someone or some group. As Mansfield de-
scribes this, “Stato in The Prince is used almost invariably in an exploitative sense: someone is almost al-
ways exploiting someone else by means of lo stato. It might be better to say that stato is such exploitation, 
and one might wish to avoid the anachronism exploitation and speak of domination (dominio) or mastery 
(signoria) or empire (imperio) as Machiavelli does. […] Machiavelli’s stato is someone’s to acquire or to 
maintain. The state itself never acquires or maintains on its own account separate from the advantage of 
some group” (Harvey Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 290).  
47 Discorsi I.1: Machiavelli, Discoursi, 195-96; Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 8. 
48 “And because men operate either by necessity or by choice and because one sees there to be greater 
virtue where choice has less authority” (Discorsi I.1: ibid., 195; 8). 
49 Discorsi I.1: ibid., 195–97; 8–9. 
50 Machiavelli mentions the care taken by the Egyptian king and the Ottoman sultan to develop laws and 
institutions precisely to counter the negative effects of a fertile territory. See Discorsi I.1: ibid., 196; 9.  
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site might bring, the laws should be ordered to constrain it by imposing such necessities as 
the site does not provide.”51 Thus, the founder’s attention must move quickly from the se-
lection of a site to what would seem to be clearly extraterritorial considerations: the founda-
tion of the city with good laws without which the choice of the site—sterile or fertile—
would be for naught.  
And yet, as Machiavelli’s argument progresses, it becomes clear that what deter-
mines the “goodness of the laws” has less to do with the prevention of vices engendered by 
the quality of the land than with the development of certain features that will enable the 
city to resist the effects of historical change.52 The foundation, modes, and orders of the city 
are not to be arranged with the aim of protecting a carefully chosen and defended territory 
from potential attack, but neither are they necessarily to be arranged with the sole aim of 
increasing fairness, justice, or even equality in the city.53 They are to be arranged with an 
aim toward the city’s expansion.54 Machiavelli cites the examples of Sparta and Venice, 
which were both ruined by the acquisitions they had made because they were not ordered 
for the eventuality of their success and the expansion of their dominion over others.55 For 
Machiavelli, the failure of Venice lay in the fact that those who governed did not employ 
the people in war; and the failure of Sparta lay in the fact that the governors did not open 
their city to expansion with foreigners.56 Rome did both, and for this reason was able to eas-
ily hold its acquisitions when it began to expand.57 Based on the Roman policy of employ-
                                                        
51 Discorsi I.1: ibid, 195; 8; see also I.3: ibid., 206; 15; I.4: ibid., 208; 16.  
52 For Machiavelli, it is clear that cities—whether they are principalities or republics—can owe their laws 
and institutions to one founder in the way that Sparta was founded by Lycurgus. The case of Rome offers 
another model entirely. Rome was noteworthy not because it had a single founder, but rather because, 
though it began with imperfect laws, the circumstances of its subsequent history caused it to restructure 
itself in the way Machiavelli considers most capable of carrying out the necessity of expansion. In a 
strong sense, Rome’s history—the interplay of events, institutions, and laws—was its foundation. See 
Discorsi I.2: ibid., 204–205; 14. 
53 As Machiavelli states in the midst of this discussion: “But since all things of men are in motion and 
cannot stay steady, they must either rise or fall; and to many things that reason does not bring you, neces-
sity brings you. So that when a republic that has been ordered so as to be capable of maintaining itself 
does not expand, and necessity leads it to expand, this would come to take away its foundations and 
make it come to ruin sooner” (Discorsi I.6: ibid., 218–19; 23; also Discorsi II.3: ibid., 385–86; 134). 
54 In different places, Machiavelli understands this expansion in terms of the acquisition of both territory 
and people, but the emphasis is on those who are conquered. Thus, in contrast to Venice and Sparta, Ro-
man victories brought territorial expansion only because previously conquered peoples served as external 
matter for swelling the ranks of Rome’s citizens. This happened because Rome’s laws and institutions left 
open pathways for the conquered to acquire citizenship. See Discorsi II.3: ibid., 384–85; 134; II.4: ibid., 387–
88; 136; II.23: ibid., 456–57; 182.  
55 See Principe XII; Discorsi I.6. For a different reason why the Venetian strategy did not prevail, see Princi-
pe XX: Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 154-55; Machiavelli, The Prince, 84. 
56 Discorsi I.6; II.3: Machiavelli, Discoursi, 385-86; Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 134; II.4: ibid., 387–88; 136. 
57 As he states, this “gave the plebs strength, increase and infinite opportunities for tumult” (Discorsi I.6: 
ibid., 214–15; 21). 
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ing Roman citizens in war and even offering conquered populations the chance to become 
citizens, Machiavelli’s version of republican Rome displays multiple lines of reasoning that 
directly address the relationship of the prince to the people.58  
However, in order to employ the population in this way, the laws and institutions of 
Rome had to be organized to allow for disturbances caused by a population both trained for 
war and constantly growing.59 In fact, Machiavelli attributes the goodness of Rome’s laws 
and institutions to the fact that for a time, they opened up a space where the demands and 
accusations of the common people could be heard. According to Machiavelli’s analysis, 
Rome’s organization allowed it to vent the conflict all cities experience, constituted as they 
are, through the perpetual conflict of the two groups Machiavelli identifies as the basis of 
all political organizations: the common people and the great. Machiavelli locates the ultimate 
organizing principle of all states in this fundamental conflict of princes and peoples.60 As he 
states, 
 
If one considers the end of the nobles [nobili] and the not-nobles [ignobili], one will see in the 
former a great desire to dominate and in the latter only the desire not to be dominated [solo 
desiderio di non essere dominati], and thus a greater will to live freely [maggiore volontà di vivere 
liberi].61  
     
While Machiavelli defines princes through their desire for rule, he consistently defines the 
people, both in the Principe and the Discorsi, through their desire for no-rule.62 However, by 
understanding princes and peoples as being different in this respect and, through that dif-
ference, perpetually in conflict,63 Machiavelli makes it the principal task of the princes of the 
                                                        
58 For Machiavelli, the principality and the republic are not as distinct as has been argued by some com-
mentators. As Sullivan and Scott state, and I agree: “Not only does he insist on calling the leading men of 
the republic ‘Princes’, but he shows how the devious maneuverings of these leading men kept the mass of 
citizens from exercising control in the regime (Discorsi, I.47-48, III.11). Moreover he shows how a republic 
can overcome the problem, endemic and dangerous to republics, that of slowness to act (Discorsi, I.59, 
III.6) by infusing itself with the resoluteness, even the despotic character, of princely regimes (Discorsi, 
III.1). Machiavelli does not consider princes and republics to be completely separate or to be contradicto-
ry in nature” (Vickie Sullivan, and John Scott, “Patricide and the Plot of the Prince: Cesare Borgia and 
Machiavelli’s Italy”, American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 4 (1994), 897). See also Discorsi I.2 on the 
relationship between principality and the “natural” cycle of governments experienced by all republics. 
59 As Machiavelli concludes, if the population was to be ordered in a way that allowed it to expand, it was 
no longer possible to govern it in the manner of a Venice or a Sparta, where the issue of territory in the 
case of Venice and the good ordering of laws in the case of the code handed down by Lycurgus were key 
for determining how both of these cities in fact came to be governed (Discorsi I.6: Machiavelli, Discoursi, 
216-17; Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 22–3). 
60 See Discorsi I.5, I.16, I.55; Principe IX; and Niccolò Machiavelli, Istorie Fiorentine e altre opere storiche e 
politiche (Torino: UTET, 2007), I.12, III.1, IV.1.  
61 Discorsi I.5: Machiavelli, Discoursi, 213-15; Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 17–19.  
62 See Vatter, Between Form and Event, 94–95. 
63 As Lefort states, “The reversal of perspectives does not authorize us to judge that only the second one is 
legitimate. It is only necessary for us to agree that all society is divided into rulers and ruled and that the 
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state—whether a principality or a republic—to consistently secure the people to the ongoing 
projects through which the state reconstitutes and augments the effectiveness of its modes 
and orders.64 Insofar as the people are essentially defined by a psychologically constitutive 
humor [umore]—their desire not to be ruled—a significant portion of the projects, modes, 
and orders of the prince(s) of the state must be deployed to secure the people to its pro-
jects.65 Because the people are in a very real sense a variable in the projects of those who rule, 
they are in a position to threaten them simply by virtue of the possibility of denying their 
support.66  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
exterior signs of liberty cover over a de facto inequality, whose consequences lend themselves to multiple 
arrangements” (Claude Lefort, Le travail de l’oeuvre Machiavel (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 496). 
64 Althusser clearly articulates the degree to which the army as a national institution is central to this pro-
ject of securing the people to the state: “We find that the forms of recruitment and organization of the 
army have, for their effect, rendered the end interior to the army itself [de rendre la fin intérieure a l’armée 
elle-même], and that the realization of the army is already in itself the realization of the end. It is not only 
that the mean is not external to the end, but the end is internal to the mean, since the people that the state as-
signs the end of uniting and expanding the state—the army of Machiavelli with its popular recruitment, 
its amalgam of town and country, its supremacy of infantry over calvary—this same army has already 
formed and united the people by the very fact of its being constituted. The army is able to be a political 
means only if it is already the realized form of this politics. The sole existence of Machiavelli’s army is 
something entirely other than a means for resolving a problem: it is already the solution of this problem. 
Therewith, Machiavelli affirms by this remarkable proposition that the required means to resolve a prob-
lem must already be in themselves [Machiavel affirme par là cette proposition remarquable que les moyens propres 
à résoudre un problème doivent déjà être en soi]. On the political level, this position takes the following para-
doxical form: the army, which is force in the state—and as such can be contrasted with forms of consent 
or distinguished from them—is not only a force. It is also at the same time an institution that acts socially 
and politically on the spirit of the soldiers and the people, and, in doing so, is an institution that forms 
consent. The military apparatus simultaneously exercises an ideological function [L’appareil militaire exerce 
en même temps une fonction idéologique]. Ideology thus figures in the army as the other means of power for 
the Prince” (Louis Althusser, Machiavel et nous (Paris: Editions Tallandier, 2009), 156). 
65 The necessity for this becomes apparent if we recall here that no limiting or restraining factor can be 
identified within the humors [umori] themselves. Thus, Sfez locates the nature of humors in a compulsion 
to disequilibrium as a kind of excess: “Irrepressible, the humor is a tendency toward disequilibrium and 
ceaselessly puts to an incessant test the loss of all equilibrium [l'humeur déséquilibre et expose à l'épreuve 
incessante de la perte de tout équilibre], although to speak of the political relation in terms of humors is to 
speak of them in terms of the search for an equilibrium in disequilibrium [la recherche d'un équilibre dans le 
déséquilibre]” (Gérald Sfez, Machiavel, la politique du moindre mal (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1999), 209–10). See Discorsi I.46.  
66 Philip Pettit makes a strong argument for a notion of nondomination as a third alternative to the republi-
can notions of freedom as noninterference and freedom as self-mastery that has a strong resemblance to 
the notion of freedom here described by Machiavelli. In fact, Pettit cites these passages in Machiavelli for 
a notion of freedom as noninterference but also, more importantly, as articulating a notion of freedom as 
nondomination, conceived as the opposite of slavery. See Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom 
and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Ch. 1, esp. Secs. III and IV.  
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 Thus, Rome was ordered for expansion and not for civic harmony67 because its 
modes and institutions were organized to allow Rome’s people—foreign and native, soldier 
and citizen—to vent their desire for no rule within the political space. Rome’s success did 
depend on the ordering of its laws; however, the main aim was not to order this city’s laws 
with an eye toward ruling it with greater justice, especially if such justice would involve an 
appeal to an objective, normative standard.68 According to Machiavelli’s argument, the 
main objective for the organization of the laws and institutions of Rome was to increase 
freedom and expand the city.69  
 
Foucault and the Conflict of Peoples and Princes  
Having examined these themes relating to territory and the people in Machiavelli, we 
should now be on firmer ground to examine once again Foucault’s reading of him: Was 
Rome’s organization simply for the sake of increasing the security of the prince vis-à-vis his 
territory? The lines of reasoning we have now followed would seem to indicate that this is 
not the case for Machiavelli. Rather, the Roman republic was organized as it was for the 
sake of preserving and increasing freedom, not security. This organization around freedom 
reflects back on the issue of territoriality in two ways. First, Machiavelli subordinates issues 
connected to the territory itself—i.e., the site—to the relationship between the princes of the 
city and its people. Thus, the choice of a sterile site would be a worthy one if “men were 
content to live off their own and did not wish to seek to command others.”70 Because the 
ruling element composing states seeks to vent an ambition to command, while the people 
seek to enjoy security, their conflict creates an internal necessity for the city to be disposed 
to exceed its territorial limits. Here Machiavelli clearly subordinates issues of territoriality 
to the perpetual conflict of the umori constituting all states. Although Foucault bases his 
interpretation of Machiavelli on the relationship of the prince to his principality, he con-
                                                        
67 See Lynch “War and Foreign Affairs in Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories”, 22–23). 
68 Interestingly enough, Foucault gives a very succinct description of this conflict during the January 21st 
lecture: “A binary structure traverses society, and you see appear there something I will try to return to 
and which is very important. The great pyramidal description that the Middle Ages or the philosophical–
political theories gave of the social body, the great image of the organism or the human body given by 
Hobbes, or even the ternary organization (in three orders) that prevailed in France (and up to a certain 
extent in a number of other countries in Europe) and which continued to articulate a certain number of 
discourses or, in any case, most institutions, a binary conception of society [une conception binaire de la 
société]. There are two groups, two categories of individuals, two armies present. […] And beneath the 
lapses of memory, the illusions, and the lies that would have us believe that there is a ternary order, a 
pyramid of subordinations, beneath the lies that would have us believe that the social body is governed 
by either natural necessities or functional demands, we must rediscover the war that is still going on, war 
with all its accidents and incidents”. And, as Foucault concludes, for this type of discourse the state 
would be nothing other than the way these two groups continue to conduct this war but, since it occurs 
within the modes and orders of the state, they conduct it peacefully (Foucault, Il faut defendre la Société, 44; 
Society Must Be Defended, 51).  
69 See Discorsi I.2, I.4, I.6, I.40: esp. 313–14; 87; also II.1: esp. 372–73; 126.  
70 Discorsi I.1: ibid., 195–96; 8. 
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ceives this relationship in terms of singularity, externality, and transcendence.71 Machiavel-
li’s theory of the conflict of the umori, in both the Principe and the Discorsi, does describe a 
relationship of the prince (or princes) to the principality, but one that is better described as 
immanent than as transcendent, given that the very character of princes and peoples springs 
from this conflict.72 This aspect of Machiavelli’s reasoning is clearly absent in Foucault’s 
description of the reception of Machiavelli’s works in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.  
The second way that the organization around freedom relates to the issue of territori-
ality stems from the fact that for Machiavelli, it is not possible for a city to remain the same 
indefinitely.73 The historical expresses, fundamentally, an openness to the aleatory, unpre-
dictable consequences and effects being drawn, on the one hand, from the perpetual inter-
nal conflict constitutive of all states and, on the other, from those ‘external’ events that 
augment and modify the relationships of the groups that make up this conflict.74 Thus, for 
Machiavelli, it was important that Rome be ordered for expansion—and not for stability—
                                                        
71 These features would seem to characterize Foucault’s reading not only when Foucault develops the 
arguments of writers like Innocent Gentillet and Guillaume de la Perrière in the February 1st lecture but 
also earlier, in the January 25th lecture, where Foucault would appear to be discussing his own reading of 
Machiavelli. 
72 Note here Pasquino: “It could be pointed out that the civil war of the Roman republic, which Machia-
velli praised in his Discourses, is not just a secret or hidden war, it is a war with neither dead or weapons; 
and it is for this reason, moreover, that the Florentine secretary praises it. But one could also point out 
that it is for this very same reason that the discourse of war that Foucault attempted to analyze during his 
1976 course is situated after all, outside of political discourse, for the discourse of politics must be able to 
join conflict and the order, peace, and security of the members of the city” (Pasquino, “Political Theory of 
War and Peace”, 82–83). 
73 Foucault acknowledges his awareness of this aspect of Machiavelli’s thought, however briefly, in the 
January 18th lecture: “Le responsable politique dans l’antiquité gréco-romaine, au Moyen Âge, jusqu’a 
Napoléon compris et peut-être meme au-delà, joue avec la mauvaise fortune et, Machiavel l’a montré, il y 
a toute une série de règles de jeu par rapport à la mauvaise fortune” (Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Popula-
tion, 33; Security, Territory, Population, 31).  
74 As Vatter states, “Whether the [revolutionary] changes have internal or external causes, in no case does 
the political and legal order control their advent: the return to beginnings is something that ‘happens’ to 
the state and the state has no control over these events” (Vatter, Between Form and Event, 255). Vatter ar-
gues that Machiavelli’s state is an effect of the conflict of the umori, and, as such, there exists neither with-
in it nor in relation to it an independent, transcendent vantage point. As Del Lucchese reads Vatter on this 
point: “Machiavelli situates human existence and activities in the relational and conflictual field of the 
relation between virtù and fortune. As Vatter correctly contends, this dynamic is inexhaustible not be-
cause of the ontological ‘consistency’ of virtù and its prevalence on and against fortuna, but because of 
their common contingent character [è inesauribile non tanto per la 'consistenza' onotologica della virtù e la sua 
prevalenza 'su' e 'contro' la fortuna, quanto per il loro comune carattere contingente]. Virtu`and fortuna do not 
pre-exist their encounter [riscontro], but they exist only in and through the conflicts that determine the 
field of these human actions” (Filippo Del Lucchese, “La città divisa: Esperienza del conflitto e novità 
politica in Machiavelli”, in Filippo Del Lucchese, Luca Sartorello, and Stefano Visentin (eds.), Machiavelli: 
Immaginazione e contingenza (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2006), 25). See also del Lucchese’s treatment of this theme, 
in Filippo Del Lucchese, Conflict, Power and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza (New York: Continuum, 
2009), esp. in Chs. 4 and 5. 
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because of the unforeseen historical imperatives that would emerge for which no prudent 
founder could provide. Territory played its part in Rome’s imperial formula, but this was 
subordinate to the way Rome’s modes and orders opened, for a time, a space of freedom 
through which an armed, ordered, and growing population could vent its desire not to be 
ruled. 
 
Conclusion 
But finally, given the analysis in this paper, have there emerged any compelling strategic 
reasons why Foucault might have interpreted Machiavelli in the way that he does?75 One 
effect of Foucault’s approach to the traditions that received and transmitted Machiavelli is 
that it allows him to describe the theoretical movements associated with les arts de gouverner 
in the sixteenth century and raison d’État in the eighteenth century in a way that interesting-
ly precludes any importance Machiavelli might have had for the intentions and concerns of 
these later authors. This allows Foucault to highlight the histories of other practices and 
techniques of governance—such as the pastoral techniques he introduces in the February 
22nd lecture and the relationship he uncovers between pastoral government and the practic-
es associated with raison d’État in the lectures of March 8th and 15th. These alternative histo-
ries are otherwise suppressed because of the role Machiavelli generally plays in discussions 
of the transition between Renaissance and early modern political thought.76 
 However, there also emerges a compelling common thread between the two authors. 
The primary focus of Machiavelli’s reasoning is not the relationship of princes to their terri-
tories, but rather the relationship between princes and peoples. As Foucault’s critique of 
Machiavelli’s reception by the sixteenth- and eighteenth- century movements makes clear, it 
is deeply questionable whether Machiavelli even concerns himself with developing rules 
for achieving the security of a sovereign who is situated in some sense external to the regime 
and is therefore perpetually confronted with the necessity of securing his relationship to the 
                                                        
75 An important direction for further inquiry here, and one that exceeds this current study, would involve 
following up on the resemblance that Foucault’s reading of the tradition associated with raison d’État—
and his criticism of it—bears to Carl Schmitt’s criticism of Friedrich Meinecke’s reading of Machiavelli as 
essentially reducible to the doctrine of raison d’État. On the relationship between Foucault’s reading of 
Machiavelli and its relationship to the works of both Schmitt and Meinecke, see Barthas, “Machiavelli in 
Political Thought from the Age of Revolutions to the Present”, esp. 261; and Barthas, L’argent n’est pas le 
nerf de la guerre, esp. 5–37. 
76 Michel Senellart describes the effect of Foucault’s critique in just these terms: “Mais on peut encore, me 
semble-t-il, effectuer un pas de plus, et c’est là que l’interprétation foucauldienne de la problématique du 
Prince, toute sommaire et partiale que’elle soit, me paraît également très stimulante. Réduire l’oeuvre de 
Machiavel au Prince et ce dernier à la seule question—centrale, certes, mais liée à tout un réseau d’autres 
thèmes—de la domination du prince sur un territoire acquis ou conquis, n’est-ce pas ramener cette oeu-
vre au point le plus proche de la non-existence pure et simple? […] Car il ne s’agit plus ici de contester 
l’originalité de Machiavel—point de vue qui peut s’argumenter de diverses façons—, mais de reconstitu-
er, sans lui, la genèse de la pensée politique moderne—position, quant à elle, proprement insoutenable” 
(Senellart, “Machiavel à l’épreuve de la gouvernmentalité”, 219–20).  
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people against an alterity arising from both foreign and domestic threats. This formulation 
places too great a distance between princes and those they govern. Upon close examination 
of Machiavelli’s principal texts that are relevant to the themes discussed by Foucault, the 
immediacy of princes to peoples springs from the fold formed by the difference between the 
qualities of the umori. For Machiavelli, this difference—unstable and porous—between 
those who desire to dominate and those who desire not to be dominated is immanent to the 
political. No matter how venerable and established they are, the modes, orders, laws, and 
institutions of political communities do not cancel or suspend this difference as they reorder 
it, for a time, into peaceful, but shifting, channels of conflict.77 For Machiavelli, this fold of the 
umori engenders both the nature of the state and the kinds of strategies and tactics it em-
ploys to respond to fortuna. Understood from this perspective, there would seem to open a 
clear space where the works of Foucault and Machiavelli overlap, in the theme of historically 
generated political technique(s). 78 
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77 See note 68 above. 
78 As Holden and Stuart make clear: “Although almost all of the readings of his work from this time are 
critical, and aim to dispute various aspects of that privileged text The Prince, something of Machiavelli's 
work continues. That something is precisely this question of political technique” (Holden, and Elden, “‘It 
Cannot be a Real Person’”, 15). 
